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We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
-T.S. Eliot1
I. Introduction
The public enthusiasm for environmental protection that swept
the country in the early 1970s was premised on the view that
ecological degradation is an unacceptable price for social and
economic progress. To ensure protection, many argued, the
environment should be recognized in state constitutions as well as
the United States constitution. On May 18, 1971, Pennsylvania
citizens overwhelmingly approved such a provision.2 Article I,
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
benefit of all the people.3
More than a quarter century later, the promise of Article I,
Section 27 has been realized more by the enactment and implemen-
tation of legislation and regulations addressing specific problems
1. Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS 59 (1943).
2. The vote was 1,021,342 in favor and 259,979 opposed. See Franklin L. Kury, The
Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution: Twenty Years Later and Largely
Untested, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 123 (1990). Four other proposed constitutional
amendments were included in the referendum. Two were adopted, but by much smaller
margins, and two were defeated. See id. at 123-24 n.2. No candidate for statewide office that
day received as many votes. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 596 n.1 (Pa. 1973) (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
3. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Two other environmental amendments had been adopted
earlier. The first amendment authorized the state to create debt and issue bonds for $70
million for land acquisition of state parks and other conservation, recreation, and historic
preservation purposes. See id. art. VIII, § 15. The second amendment authorized the state
to create debt and issue bonds for $500 million for, among other things, "the conservation
and reclamation of land and water resources of the Commonwealth, including the elimination
of acid mine drainage, sewage, and other pollution from the streams of the Commonwealth
.... " Id. art. VIII, § 16.
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than by the Amendment itself. Franklin Kury, the author and chief
legislative sponsor of the Pennsylvania Amendment has conceded
that it is "still largely untested as an environmental protection
tool."'4 As its early supporters feared, the Amendment seems to
have more symbolic than substantive value, inscribed on plaques
and quoted in speeches, but rarely used in decision making.
While the first major judicial decision was supportive of the
Amendment, a subsequent decision greatly diminished its impor-
tance. In the first decision, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower,' the courts held that the Amendment created a
self-executing public right, but that construction of an observation
tower overlooking the Gettysburg Civil War battlefield would not
violate that right.6 Shortly thereafter, in Payne v. Kassab,' the
commonwealth court developed a three-part test for applying the
Amendment that utterly ignores the constitutional text,8 but which
has been widely used ever since. The test is so weak that litigants
using it to challenge environmentally damaging projects are almost
always unsuccessful. Undercut but not overruled by Payne, the
Gettysburg Tower decision has seen little use.
In another series of cases, however, the supreme court has
used the Amendment to support decisions to uphold statutes or
ordinances whose constitutionality or applicability is challenged on
other grounds. In one of these cases, United Artists' Theater
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,9 the supreme court used the
Amendment to uphold the constitutionality of a historic preserva-
tion ordinance that was challenged by a landowner as a taking of
private property without compensation in violation of the state
constitution. ° Cases such as United Artists' suggest that environ-
mental principles and values may only be capable of complete
4. Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution,
in 1 PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 2-3, at 26 (Joel R. Burcat &
Terry L. Bossert eds. 1998). As a former member of the Pennsylvania House of Represen-
tatives, Mr. Kury drafted and sponsored the amendment that became Article I, Section 27.
See id. § 2-1 n.1.
5. 13 Adams County L.J. 45 (jurisdiction), 75 (opinion of the court), 135 (supplemental
opinion of the court) (C.P. Adams County 1971), aff'd, 302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973),
affd, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
6. See id.
7. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), affid, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
8. See id. at 94.
9. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
10. See id. at 620.
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protection if they are of equal legal status to the other values and
principles identified in the constitution.
11
However tentatively, such cases recognize that Article I,
Section 27 matters because it does something that statutes and
regulations cannot do; it makes environmental and historic
protection part of the constitutional purpose of state government.
This two-part Article explains how the Amendment accomplishes
that purpose and what it should mean for Pennsylvania, and
suggests the value of similar inquiries under other state and
national constitutions.
My starting point is that Article I, Section 27 is constitutional
law, and is no less so than other provisions of the state constitution
simply because it pertains to the environment. This Article
suggests a framework for applying the Amendment in Pennsylva-
nia, building on parts of the state's experience, criticizing other
parts, and suggesting approaches that have not yet been tried. We
should not be bound by the way that prior cases under Article I,
Section 27 were litigated and judged if we see new ways of
understanding and applying the Amendment.
The role of constitutional provisions in environmental
protection is likely to continue to grow in importance. More than
two-thirds of state constitutions contain provisions concerning
natural resources and the environment, and all state constitutions
written since 1959 have such provisions. 12  Nearly all national
constitutions adopted or revised since 1972 have included a
constitutional right to a decent environment.13 The United States
Constitution contains no such provision, although proposals for
such an amendment continue to surface.
1 4
Pennsylvania's experience is particularly important in under-
standing such provisions because Article I, Section 27 is the most
11. These cases do not suggest that the Amendment's values are superior to those stated
elsewhere in the constitution.
12. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The
Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 865, 871 (1996).
13. See Dinah Shelton, Challenges to the Future of Civil and Political Rights, 55 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 669, 682 (1998).
14. See WILLIAM H. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.5 (1994 & Supp. 1998)
(summarizing proposals and suggested existing constitutional sources). But see J.B. Ruhl,
The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental Quality
Amendments Don't Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (1999) (arguing that the U.S.
Constitution should not contain an environmental amendment). Prof. Ruhl's argument,
however, is not addressed to state amendments. See id. at 252 n.22.
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prominent environmental amendment to a state constitution. 15
The Gettysburg Tower case was recently described as "undoubtedly
the best known of any state court opinion which has construed the
meaning of a state environmental constitutional provision."' 6
Indeed, the Pennsylvania Amendment has been recommended for
consideration in other national constitutions. 7 Pennsylvania's
Amendment also provides a rich source of experience for under-
standing such provisions.
Environmental amendments to state or national constitutions
are attractive, however, only if they can be applied in a meaningful
way. 8 That, in turn, requires a coherent and practical framework
for interpreting them. The Pennsylvania cases interpreting Article
I, Section 27, unfortunately, do not provide that framework. These
cases generally do not recognize the constitutional status of Article
I, Section 27, only inconsistently recognize the Amendment as a
source of government authority, and do not impose any meaningful
restraint on government power.
As Part I of this Article explains, the Amendment has been
less than fully effective for four basic reasons. First, it is treated as
a single indivisible rule even though it contains two separate rules.
Second, Article I, Section 27 has been understood as categorically
anti-development, as potentially putting a halt to most if not all
human activities. Third, much more attention has been given to
the creation of citizen rights than to the governmental responsibili-
ties on which those rights are primarily based. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, there has never been a generally accepted
explanation for why Article I, Section 27 even matters given the
predominant role of legislation and administrative regulation
15. See ROGERS, supra note 14, § 1.5 (describing Article I, Section 27 as the "best
known" of state environmental amendments). The Amendment is discussed at length in
numerous articles about environmental amendments to state constitutions. See, e.g., Carole
L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day,
1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107, 141-47 (1997); Bruce Ledewitz, The
Challenge of, and Judicial Response to, Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions, 4
EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 33 (1991). Article I, Section 27 is also discussed in
environmental law textbooks. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATITER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 1023-29 (2d ed. 1998).
16. Gallagher, supra note 15, at 141.
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, Comment, In Defense of Environmental Rights in East
European Constitutions, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 191, 215 (suggesting East
European countries adopt constitutional provision similar to Pennsylvania's).
18. Shelton, supra note 13, at 683-84.
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concerning environmental protection and natural resources conser-
vation.
This part of the Article suggests an interpretative framework
for understanding the Amendment that responds directly to these
four reasons. That framework begins with the recognition that the
Amendment creates two separate constitutional rules-one
concerning the public's right to clean air, pure water, and the
preservation of certain environmental values; and the other creating
a public right in the conservation and maintenance of public natural
resources.
Second, Article I, Section 27 gives the environment the same
legal protection that other provisions of the state constitution give
to individual property rights. The Amendment, when balanced by
provisions protecting property rights, is thus not anti-development.
Rather, it is directed toward environmentally sustainable develop-
ment.
Third, Article I, Section 27 needs to be understood primarily
on the basis of governmental responsibilities. While citizen rights
are an essential part of the Amendment, such rights should be
directed primarily at enforcement of the government's duties.
Finally, when legislation or administrative regulation provides
as much protection as Article I, Section 27, or even more protec-
tion, there is no need for judicial enforcement of the Amendment.
Where legal gaps exist, however, courts should enforce the
substantive rules contained in the Amendment. Courts should also
use Article I, Section 27 to support the application of other legal
rules. These four premises create a framework for understanding
the environmental rights and public trust parts of the Amendment,
which will be discussed in detail in Part I of this Article.
This interpretative framework is new in the sense that it
explains Article I, Section 27 in significantly different ways than we
have understood it. Yet this framework is also based primarily on
the text, legislative history, and purposes of the Amendment. It
attempts to capture the original understanding of Article I, Section
27, informed by subsequent experience with the Amendment and
with environmental protection. After nearly three decades, it is
time to revisit Article I, Section 27 and know it-as if for the first
time.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
II. A Two-Part Amendment
A. Environmental Rights and Public Trust
A basic principle of legal reasoning is that each rule that might
be applicable to a particular factual situation should be discussed
separately.19 Separate discussion ensures a clear discussion of
each rule and also ensures that differences in the text and purpose
of each rule are honored. Article I, Section 27 has two separate
parts; it creates a public right in a decent environment, and it
creates a separate public right in the conservation and protection
of "public natural resources., 20  The two parts differ in scope, in
the type of public rights they create, and in the responsibilities they
articulate for the state. Because these two parts contain separate
legal rules, it is impossible to analyze the Amendment in a useful
manner unless each part is discussed separately. However, Article
I, Section 27 is almost always quoted in its entirety and analyzed as
an undivided whole.21 The Amendment is thus more often
understood as expressing a vague environmental sentiment than as
expressing constitutional law.
The distinction is made evident by dividing the Amendment
into these two parts, and numbering them as if they were separate
paragraphs:
(1) The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and
to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment.
(2) Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
19. See JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING AND
LEGAL METHOD 108-13 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasizing the importance of discussing each issue
and sub-issue separately).
20. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; see also ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175 (1985) ("If the courts were to accept the clear language of the
section as expressing two separate concepts, it would result in a more logical and orderly
application of the section, and would permit a more accurate application of the principles of
constitutional construction and of trusts."); Kury, supra note 2, at 143-47; Robert Broughton,
The Proposed Pennsylvania Declaration of Environmental Rights, Analysis of HB 958, 41 PA.
BAR ASS'N Q. 421, 425 (1970). Broughton's article is also printed in 1970 Pa. Legislative
Journal-House 2272 (April 14, 1970).
21. Among the dozens of decided cases, the only obvious exceptions are Commonwealth
v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc. and Payne v. Kassab. Even for these two,
however, the courts' analysis does not always clearly distinguish the two parts. See infra Part
II.B.
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come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Constitutional interpretation, of course, begins with the text of
the Amendment. Different but similar sounding words and phrases
ordinarily signal different meanings, especially if they are contained
in the same paragraph.22 If the drafters intended a particular
word or phrase to have the same meaning throughout, they would
have used the same word or phrase.23 Because different words
and phrases are used to articulate the scope, public rights, and
governmental responsibilities of each part, it is only logical to
conclude that the two parts of the Amendment are different and
therefore should be separately analyzed.
The two parts of Article I, Section 27 are different in scope.
The first part refers to four different "values of the environment,"
as well as "clean air" and "pure water." The second part, however,
refers to the state's "public natural resources," and later identifies
the state as the trustee for "these resources." The two sentences
in the latter part are obviously related, one declaring the resources
to be common public property, and the other requiring the state to
conserve and maintain them. The public trust part of the Amend-
ment makes no reference to environmental values, to air or water,
or even to the environment. The first part, similarly, makes no
reference to "public natural resources," or even "resources."
When the two parts overlap, they both apply.24 To the extent
that air and water have not been privately appropriated, they are
subject to both environmental rights and the public trust doctrine.
Natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment that
22. See WOODSIDE, supra note 20, at 175.
23. See, e.g., Novicki v. O'Mara, 124 A. 672, 673 (Pa. 1924) ("A change in language in
separate provisions of a statute is prima facie evidence of a change of intent."). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court routinely cites statutory construction rules when interpreting
the state constitution. See Cavanaugh v. Davis, 440 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1982). The practice is
reasonable because constitutional amendments originate in the legislature. See PA. CONST.
art XI, § 1.
24. See WOODSIDE, supra note 20, at 180. It is likely that all "public natural resources"
contain at least some "natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment." At
a minimum, it would seem obvious that "public natural resources" would have some
"natural" values. As a result, there is likely no category of resources or values for which
there is a public trust responsibility but no environmental right in the public under the first
part of the Amendment. On the other hand, not all state property constitutes natural
resources.
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are on public lands are also subject to both parts of the Amend-
ment.
The public rights contained in the two parts are also different.
The Amendment's first part creates a right in the public to clean
air, pure water, and the preservation of certain values. The second
part of Article I, Section 27 articulates the public's property right
to the state's public natural resources, and establishes a public right
to have those resources conserved and maintained for the benefit
of future generations. 25  These rights are different, and the
difference is perhaps most evident when the scope of the two parts
overlaps. Air and water are not simply to be conserved and
maintained; the public has a right to these resources in "clean" and
"pure" form. Similarly, the conservation and maintenance require-
ments for public natural resources are supplemented by an
obligation to protect the public's right to preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment. As
a result, Article I, Section 27 creates two public rights, not one.
Finally, the governmental responsibilities in both parts of the
Amendment are also different. The public trust part of Article I,
Section 27 expressly requires the state to "conserve and maintain"
public resources "for the benefit of all the people." By contrast,
the public rights contained in the first part carry no express
corresponding governmental responsibility. To the extent that such
a responsibility exists, it must be implied. Quite plainly, the
articulation of those rights would be meaningless unless the
government had some duty to protect them. But the nature of that
duty is not specified.
These differences in public rights, scope, and governmental
responsibility are reinforced by the legislative history of the
Amendment. Legislative history is relevant in determining the
meaning of a constitutional provision, even when the text is
unambiguous. 26 In accordance with the state constitution, Article
I, Section 27 was passed by both houses of the legislature in one
session, then passed by both houses in the next legislative session,
before being submitted to the voters for approval." The textual
25. See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 20, at 422; Kury, supra note 2, at 124.
26. See In re Determination of Priority of Comm'n Among Certain Judges of the
Superior Court and Commonwealth Court, 427 A.2d 153, 156-57 (Pa. 1981); In re Martin's
Estate, 74 A.2d 120, 122 (Pa. 1950); Zemprelli v. Thornburgh, 407 A.2d 102, 109 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1979).
27. See PA. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
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changes made to the Amendment in the legislative process indicate
that Article I, Section 27 was understood to have two separate
parts. To begin with, the environmental rights part of the Amend-
ment went through the process unchanged, while the public trust
part of the Amendment was changed in four ways.28 This differ-
ence in legislative attention suggests that the two parts were
understood from the outset as having separate meanings.
This difference in meanings of the two parts is reinforced by
two of the specific amendments that were adopted. In its original
form, the public trust part of the Amendment declared that
"Pennsylvania's natural resources" were the "common property of
all the people., 29  The absence of "public" before "natural
resources," however, suggested that the Amendment might convert
private property containing natural resources into the people's
''common property." The Amendment's drafters believed that such
a result would likely violate the constitutional prohibition against
the taking of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion.3" The language was thus changed to "Pennsylvania's public
natural resources."31 As a result, the state's public trust responsi-
bilities under Article I, Section 27 are limited to public property or
things that are subject to the public trust.32 In making this change,
moreover, the legislature made no parallel change to the first part
of the Amendment.
On the other hand, the "values of the environment" in the
environmental rights part can occur on both public and private
property, and there is nothing in the text to suggest otherwise.
While both parts of Article I, Section 27 apply to public property,
the environmental rights part of the Amendment also applies to
private property. Values in this context are not property but
28. See H.B. 958, Printer's Nos. 1105, 1307, 2860, 168th Pa. Sess. (Pa. 1969) (original bill
and two bills showing amendments); H.B. 31, Printers Nos. 32, 54, 169th Pa. Sess. (Pa. 1971)
(second session bill, with no additional amendments). In addition to the two changes
described infra in the text, the legislature deleted two parts of the public trust provisions.
It removed a requirement that public trust resources be protected "in their natural state."
Compare H.B. 958, Printer's No. 1105, with H.B. 958, Printer's No. 1307. It also removed
a list of protected natural resources. Compare H.B. 958, Printer's No. 1307, with H.B. 958,
Printer's No. 2860.
29. H.B. 958, Printer's No. 1105.
30. See Broughton, supra note 20, at 425.
31. Compare H.B. 958, Printer's No. 1105 (original language), with H.B. 958, Printer's
No. 2860 (amended language).
32. See Broughton, supra note 20, at 424.
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principles or qualities that are intrinsically valuable.33 Private
lands can, and often do, contain environmental features with
significant natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values.
A legislative change in the state's public trust responsibilities
also suggests that the two parts were understood as having separate
meanings. As originally introduced, the Amendment required the
state, as trustee, to "preserve and maintain" public natural
resources.34 The Amendment's first sentence, of course, calls for
the "preservation" of certain values. As originally introduced,
these two parts of the Amendment might thus have been under-
stood as having a similar meaning, or at least as being logically
related. State officials, however, were concerned that use of the
word "preserve" in the public trust part of the Amendment might
be construed by courts to prevent the harvesting of renewable
resources (e.g., logging on state forest land).35 In response to that
concern, the legislative committee considering the Amendment
changed the phrase to "conserve and maintain. 3 6 This change is
particularly significant because the same state officials also
suggested that the word "preservation" in the Amendment's first
sentence be changed to "conservation., 37 Of course, that sugges-
tion was not accepted.38 Such legislative history provides further
evidence that the Amendment has two distinct parts. This history
also reinforces a more fundamental point-the text matters.
B. Gettysburg Tower and Payne
Two early cases recognized a distinction between the environ-
mental rights and public trust parts of the Amendment, although
even these cases blended the two parts somewhat. Since that time,
however, the distinction has generally been overlooked.
In the first case, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower, Inc.," the Attorney General sought an injunc-
tion to prevent the construction of a 307-foot observation tower on
33. See WOODSIDE, supra note 20, at 177 (citing two dictionaries). "These are 'values'
in which the people are given a right, which the officials may not violate, but without
perverting the terms they cannot be held as trust property by a trustee." Id.
34. H.B. 958, Printer's No. 1105.
35. See Broughton, supra note 20, at 424. The principal state official expressing this
concern was Dr. Maurice K. Goddard, Secretary of the Department of Forests and Waters.
36. Id.; H.B. 958, Printer's No. 2860.
37. See Broughton, supra note 20, at 424 n.8.
38. See id.
39. 302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
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private land just outside the Gettysburg National Military Park.n°
Although the National Park Service, which administers the park,
evidently lacked the legal authority to block the tower, it had
negotiated an agreement with the company to locate the tower
slightly further from the battlefield and visitor center. The state
claimed that the Amendment prohibited the construction of the
tower because it would interfere with the experience of park
visitors, even though it would provide many visitors with a better
view of the battlefield than they could get from the ground.42
The state's claim was based on the environmental rights part
of the Amendment, not the public trust part. 3 Because the land
on which the tower would be built was privately owned,' the
Attorney General could not argue that this land was the common
property of the people. Furthermore, because the park is owned
and managed by the federal government, the Attorney General
could not argue that it was part of the state's "public natural
resources" under the public trust part of the Amendment. Rather,
the state argued that the tower's visibility throughout the Gettys-
burg Battlefield would interfere with the public right to preserva-
tion of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of that
environment.45 The public's right to the preservation of those
values, the Attorney General claimed, imposed a substantive
limitation on such private development.'
The trial court held that the Amendment's first sentence is
self-executing-that is, the people have a right to clean air, pure
water, and the preservation of certain environmental values,
regardless of whether the legislature has enacted supporting
40. See id. at 887.
41. See id. at 888-89 (summarizing agreement), 891 n.4 (citing trial court holding that
tower was not subject to federal regulation because it was outside park); see also
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 598 n.3 (Pa.
1973) (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of National Park Service director that the
purpose of the agreement was to "minimize to the extent that we could, within the authori-
ties available to us, the adverse impact of this tower on Gettysburg Park").
42. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 311 A.2d at 588-89.
43. See Gettysburg Battlefield, 302 A.2d at 892.
44. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams
County L.J. 75, 77 (C.P. Adams County 1971) ("The site is on privately owned wooded land
to the rear of a motel-restaurant complex.").
45. See id. at 83-86.
46. See id. The purpose of the lawsuit, of course, was to prevent construction of the
tower.
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legislation.47 The court also held, however, that the state had
failed to prove that the proposed tower would violate these public
rights.48 Both the commonwealth court 9 and supreme court5"
affirmed these holdings. The case was tried and decided, in sum,
on the premise that the first sentence of the Amendment prohibit-
ed interference with the values it identifies.
Because the Attorney General was seeking an injunction, and
because the court believed those values to be somewhat subjective,
the court of common pleas required the state to demonstrate
irreparable harm to the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values
of the Gettysburg environment by clear and convincing evidence.51
The trial court held that the state failed to meet that burden.52
The state's witnesses were eminent historians, architects, and
theologians, as well as state and federal park administrators.
53
They testified that the tower would intrude on the pastoral serenity
and reverence of the battlefield scene, and would interfere with an
understanding of the human scale of the battle that a tourist can
get only by walking through the battlefield itself.54 The company's
witnesses-the tower designer, a county commissioner, and an
environmental education consultant-depicted the park experience
in strikingly different terms. 55  The environmental education
consultant testified that "most of the visitors to the Park stay only
a short time, are not academicians and desire a rapid view of the
47. See id. at 79-80.
48. See id. at 82.
49. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
50. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588
(Pa. 1973).
51. See Gettysburg Tower, 13 Adams County L.J. at 136-37.
52. See id. at 86.
53. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886,
889 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
54. See id. at 889-90. Among the state's witnesses was historian Bruce Catton. The
court noted that Mr. Catton believed that to fully experience the battle, it is
[N]ecessary for one to go on the field in person, to brood while there, to translate
oneself into the 1860's [sic] and to feel the spirit and courage that animated the
men who fought there. It is his opinion that the tower would jar a person so
experiencing the battlefield back into the present day and so diminish the historic
and cultural values.
Id. at 889-90. Several of the state's witnesses, however, acknowledged that the tower would
have some educational value. See id. at 890.
55. See id. at 891.
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site and a quick understanding of the battle.,5 6  The consultant
also explained that the tower would help educate tourists about the
battle and was not inconsistent with a variety of other commercial
activities near the battlefield.57
In denying the requested injunction, the common pleas court
examined evidence of potential harm to every amenity identified
in the Amendment's first sentence-clean air, pure water, and the
natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment."
The court first held that the tower would not irreparably damage
the scenic and esthetic values of the area.59 The court found that
the tower, while conspicuous, would not "transform the scene of
present-day Gettysburg."6 Referring to evidence that sensitivity
to such matters varies from person to person, the court stated that
it would not enjoin "activities because they adversely affect the
peculiar sentiments or feelings of some but not all."'" The tower's
effect on natural values, the court held, had to be judged by its
effect on those values as they currently existed.62 The court
concluded "that the historic Gettysburg area has already been
raped" by development.63 Because of that development, the court
was not convinced that the tower's construction would irreparably
damage the area's natural values.'
56. Id.
57. See id. These activities include "a junkyard, motels, restaurants, fast food establish-
ments, souvenir stands, an amusement park, gasoline service stations, commercial museums
and exhibits and a variety of advertising signs and billboards." Id. As I know from visiting
the battlefield, a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet is visible from the rock wall where Union
troops stopped Colonel Pickett's famous charge. Witnesses also testified that the tower
would economically benefit the community by attracting more tourists. See id.
58. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams
County L.J. 75, 83-86 (C.P. Adams County 1971).
59. See id. at 84.
60. Id. The court added that towers in other areas, such as the Eiffel Tower in Paris,
had not caused "notable damage to either scenic or aesthetic values." Id. & n.6.
61. Id. at 84.
62. See id.
63. Gettysburg Tower, 13 Adams County L.J. at 85. As the court explained:
A major highway bisects the fields of Pickett's Charge. A Stuckey's
restaurant, a motel, and an ice cream parlor face the Peach Orchard. A souvenir
stand flourishes near a government observation tower opposite the Eisenhower
farm. These are but a few examples. The Federal government's only recourse in
the past has been to purchase these sites as funds become available. Then, of
course, new ventures start elsewhere in equally offensive locations.
Id.
64. See id. at 84-85. The court also held that the tower should be judged by any social,
economic, or educational value it may have, and noted that even some of the state's
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Finally, the state's claim that the tower would adversely affect
the unique historic values of the park was fatally compromised by
the agreement between the National Park Service and the defen-
dants. The Park Service has legal responsibility to manage the
military park "for the benefit of all the people of the United
States,"65 the court reasoned, suggesting that Park Service deci-
sions on such matters were thus entitled to great deference.
Because the Park Service evidently decided in signing the agree-
ment that the proposed tower would not cause irreparable harm,
the court of common pleas was unwilling to question that deci-
sion."
The common pleas court found that the proposed tower "will
have no noticeable effect whatever on the air or water of the
Gettysburg area," and "will not irreparably damage the natural,
historic, scenic or esthetic values of the environment of the
Gettysburg area."67 By distinguishing between air and water, on
one hand, and the four identified values, on the other, the trial
court indicated that the tower would noticeably but not irreparably
damage Gettysburg's natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values.
The commonwealth court and the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's decision that the Amendment's first sentence did not
prohibit construction of the tower.68
The second case, which tested the state's public trust responsi-
bility under Article I, Section 27, is Payne v. Kassab.69 In Payne,
private citizens and college students brought an original action in
commonwealth court against the state, the city of Wilkes-Barre,
and certain state and city officials to prevent the widening of a city
witnesses thought the tower would have educational value. See id. at 83-84. This point is
perhaps more relevant to the tower's effect on historic values because the tower would help
paying customers learn about the battle.
65. Id. at 85 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1994 & Supp. III. 1997)).
66. See id. at 85-86 (criticizing the Park Service for taking a "two-sided approach" to the
tower, signing the agreement but continuing to question its impact in other ways);
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 14 Adams County L.J. 52
(C.P. Adams County 1972) (mem.) (refusing to reconsider its prior opinion and continuing
to criticize the Park Service for the same reason); see also JAMES A. GLASS, THE BEGIN-
NINGS OF A NEW NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAM, 1957 TO 1969 62 (1990)
(explaining this problem as a result of conflicting organizational and legal roles within the
Park Service that were changed as a result of Gettysburg Tower).
67. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams County
L.J. 75, 78 (C.P. Adams County 1971).
68. See supra notes 49-50.
69. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
[Vol. 103:4
1999] TAKING THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 709
street to a four-lane highway approximately two-thirds of a mile in
length.7' Among other things,71 the plaintiffs argued that the
Amendment prevented the use of part of a public park for a street-
widening project.72 The street passed through one side of River
Common, which the state legislature had dedicated as a public
common in the first half of the nineteenth century.73 River
Common was 21.7 acres in size and consisted mostly of a park and
open space area with "numerous walkways and grass lawns abutted
by many trees and plants., 74  The proposed street widening
project would slice .59 acres from the park along the project's
length, slightly less than three percent of River Common's total
acreage. The project would eliminate some large trees that
eventually would be replaced, and would also require the relocation
of a walkway.
76
The Payne facts are thus quite different from those in
Gettysburg Tower, which involved the use of private land and a
claim that the use would infringe on the public's right to protection
of certain values. The River Common project affected both parts
of the Amendment, although it concerned primarily the state's
public trust responsibilities. The subject of the suit was city-owned
land that was being converted from park to road purposes, and the
court focused most of its attention on the diversion of 0.59 acres
from public commons to public road. There is little doubt, the
commonwealth court found, that this land constitutes part of the
state's public natural resources. 77 The public trust nature of this
70. See id. at 90. The street varied in width from three to four lanes, or thirty feet to
forty-six feet, along the length of the project. See id. at 90-91.
71. The plaintiffs also claimed that use of River Common for the street widening project
violated public trust law concerning the proper use of land that has been legislatively
dedicated as a commons and violated state transportation laws. See id. at 94-95.
72. See id. at 93-94.
73. See id. at 89-91.
74. Payne, 312 A.2d at 91. River Common also included the Luzerne County Court-
house, see id. at 88 & n.1, and part of River Street. See id. at 91.
75. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 269 n.11 (Pa. 1976).
76. See Payne, 312 A.2d at 92. Despite all of these changes, the court made findings
indicating that the project would not adversely affect the scenic, natural, historic, and esthetic
values of the common. See id. at 92-93. Specifically, the court found that "the project will
not significantly alter the River Common." Id. at 93.
77. Although the land is owned by the city of Wilkes-Barre, the city is a subdivision of
the state. In addition, the land was dedicated as a commons by the state legislature. The
city has a public trust responsibility under Article I, Section 27 for such land. Under Article
I, Section 27, the state also has a trust responsibility for such lands. In affirming the
commonwealth court, the supreme court said there is "no doubt that the property here
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW[
case under Article I, Section 27 is reinforced by the plaintiffs'
parallel claim that use of the commons for the street-widening
project would violate the common law of public trust for land that
has been dedicated as a commons.
In response to plaintiffs' claims that the text of Article I,
Section 27 imposed a limitation on the project, a defendant, the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, had filed briefs
proposing that a three-part test be used in lieu of the constitutional
text.78 Conveniently, the test required nothing more of the agency
than its existing statutes. 79 The commonwealth court adopted that
test as a "realistic and not merely legalistic" means of deciding
whether the Amendment has been violated. The court stated:
The court's role must be to test the decision under review by a
threefold standard: (1) Was there compliance with all applica-
ble statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the
Commonwealth's public natural resources? (2) Does the record
demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental
incursion to a minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm
which will result from the challenged decision or action so
clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom that to
proceed further would be an abuse of discretion?8'
The court then applied that test to the street-widening project
at issue.8' The court first analyzed whether the state had com-
plied with the applicable state transportation statute, which
prohibited highway construction through public parks or historical
sites unless there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use
of such land, and unless the facility is planned and constructed to
minimize the harm to the park or historical site.82 This statute,
which was based on a comparable federal statute, was one of the
most stringent environmental statutes then in effect.83 The court
involved is public property, a 'public Common', [sic] and that it is possessed of certain
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values." Payne, 361 A.2d at 272.
78. See Kury, supra note 2, at 127-28.
79. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 273 n.23.
80. Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
81. See id. at 94-96.
82. See id. at 94-95.
83. See Department of Transportation Act of 1966 § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (1994)). The Supreme Court had earlier held that the
"feasible and prudent alternative" language prohibited the federal government from
constructing a highway through a public park unless no other alternative was feasible and
prudent. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971)
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concluded that the state followed this requirement as well as
various procedural requirements in that act. 84 In addition, the
court found that the planting of new trees to replace trees that
were cut down for the project, relandscaping of the affected area,
and preservation of historic features all demonstrated a reasonable
effort to minimize the project's adverse consequences.85 Finally,
the court balanced the improvement in traffic movement that the
project would bring against the loss of roughly three percent of the
park's land area, and decided that the benefits of the project
outweighed its costs.86
In affirming the commonwealth court's decision, the supreme
court recognized the plaintiffs' claim as being anchored primarily
in the public trust part of the Amendment.87 The court's opinion
refers to the "trusteeship of the State,, 88 the "trust established by
Art. I, § 27,"89 and the state's "duties as trustee under the consti-
tutional article."9 Indeed, the supreme court expressly distin-
guished Gettysburg Tower by stating that the "property here is
public property," not private property.9  "There can be no
question," the court stated, "that the Amendment itself declares
and creates a public trust of public natural resources for the benefit
of all the people (including future generations) and that the
Commonwealth is made the trustee of said resources, commanded
to conserve and maintain them."'  The court then explained that
the safeguards provided by the state transportation statute
"vouchsafe that a breach of the trust" established by the Amend-
ment "will not occur" if state agencies comply with those safe-
guards.93 Because the statute "was complied with, we have no
hesitation in deciding that the appellee Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania has not failed in its duties as trustee" under Article I, Section
27." Compliance with the legislation, in sum, greatly reduced the
project's impact on public natural resources. As a result, the state
84. See Payne, 312 A.2d at 94-95.
85. See id. at 95.
86. See id. at 96.
87. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272-73 (Pa. 1976).
88. Id. at 273.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 272.
92. Payne, 361 A.2d at 272.
93. Id. at 273.
94. Id.
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had not violated its constitutional duty to conserve and maintain
those resources. Rather than apply the commonwealth court's
three-prong test, the supreme court merely observed in a footnote
that the commonwealth court had used it to determine compliance
with the Amendment.95
The Payne test applies only to the public trust part of the
Amendment. The commonwealth court's test is explicitly anchored
in the public trust part of Article I, Section 27, as evidenced by the
reference in the first prong to "public natural resources." The
Payne test contains no reference to the public right to clean air,
pure water, or preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, or
esthetic values of the environment. The supreme court in Payne
distinguished, and did not overrule, Gettysburg Tower.
Unfortunately, the Payne test has not been limited to the
public trust part of the Amendment. With little or no judicial
analysis or explanation, the Payne test has become an all-purpose
test for applying Article I, Section 27.9 In using the Payne test,
the courts rarely distinguish between public and private resources,
between values and resources, or between the public trust and the
right to a decent environment. Some cases decided under the
Payne test do not even involve public natural resources; rather,
they concern natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values.
97
Indeed, the Amendment's text tends to be less important to lawyers
and judges than the text of the Payne test.
The paramount role of the Payne test in analyzing both parts
of the Amendment can be explained in two ways. First, it can be
said that the court did not explicitly limit its analysis to the public
trust part of the Amendment, and that the test thus applies to both
parts of the Amendment.98  A street widening project that
involves the cutting of mature trees and the loss of public park land
95. See id. at 272 n.23.
96. See Kury, supra note 2, at 132-41 (discussing cases applying the Payne test).
97. See, e.g., Del-AWARE, Unlimited, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl.
Resources, 508 A.2d 348 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (esthetic impacts of a proposed pumping
station on a state park and surrounding historic district); Pennsylvania Envtl. Mgt. Servs., Inc.
v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 503 A.2d 477, 479-80 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)
(holding that the visibility of a proposed landfill to a nearby inn and residences as well as
an interstate highway is appropriately considered as part of aesthetic and scenic values, and
that agricultural value of land on which landfill would be located is appropriately considered
part of natural values).
98. The plaintiffs appear to have separately alleged violations of each part of the
Amendment. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 272-73.
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arguably involves both the right to preservation of environmental
values and the conservation of public natural resources.
The case is best understood, however, as involving a failure by
the courts to discuss and rule separately on each of the Amend-
ment's two parts. The commonwealth court made detailed findings
indicating that the environmental rights protected by the Amend-
ment would not be interfered with, although it did not rule on that
issue.99 The court also focused on the transfer of 0.59 acres of
park for street widening, which appears to implicate the public trust
part of the Amendment more than the environmental rights
part."°  The public trust issue, of course, predominated in the
courts' analysis.
The second reason the commonwealth court's Payne test has
come to be seen as an all-purpose test for the Amendment lies in
the way that it logically undercuts Gettysburg Tower. The state as
owner and trustee is in a stronger position to control the use of
public natural resources than the state as regulator of uses on
private property. When the state is doing the work itself, it should
more likely achieve the desired result than when it attempts to get
that result by compelling others. In addition, state regulation of
private property is subject to a variety of constitutional limitations,
particularly the takings and due process clauses. 1 '
By depriving the public trust part of the Amendment of any
substantive content, however, the Payne test reverses this analysis.
The state's responsibility for publicly owned resources-the
resources over which it has greatest control-is not to conserve
them or preserve their values, but rather to manage their degrada-
tion under the Payne test. The Payne test allows environmental
degradation to occur if the state has made a reasonable effort to
minimize the environmental incursion, and if a project's benefits
outweigh its environmental costs."0 2 Meanwhile, under Gettysburg
99. See supra note 76.
100. The loss of 0.59 acres to street widening is not necessarily inconsistent with the
preservation of certain values in the environment. It is possible, for example, to plant the
remaining area with more or healthier trees. The environmental rights part of the
Amendment, after all, focuses on values in the environment, not the resources on which
those values are based. Because the public trust part of the Amendment is based on public
natural resources, however, it is more obviously implicated by the loss of park land for the
street-widening project.
101. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; PA. CONST. art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 10.
102. Of course, reducing the rate and magnitude of environmental degradation is still a
significant accomplishment. Many state entities have used the Payne test in various ways.
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Tower, the Attorney General has the right to challenge private
activities that interfere with clean air, pure water, and the preserva-
tion of certain values. The most powerful judicial expression of
support for Article I, Section 27, in other words, has come in a case
in which the state's legal responsibility is normally more limited.
As a result, the ability of the state and perhaps citizens to
vindicate environmental rights under Gettysburg Tower is compro-
mised. If the claim is based on public natural resources, it is
subject to the Payne test. If the claim is not based on public
natural resources, it may still be subject to the Payne test because
the commonwealth court has applied that test to the values
identified in the first part of the Amendment. Even if an environ-
mental rights claim not based on public natural resources could be
separated from the Payne test, it would confront a logical dilemma.
Why should the public have a right to preservation of natural,
scenic, historic, and esthetic values that derive from private land
when the public does not appear to have that right if those values
are on public property? Because there is no defensible answer to
that question, the Payne case undermines the authority of Gettys-
burg Tower even though it does not overrule it. Obviously, the two
parts of the amendment need to be harmonized. But that cannot
properly be accomplished unless the two parts of the amendment
are analyzed and understood separately.
III. Sustainable Development, Not Anti-Development
A. Origins of Anti-Development Perception
The factual situations underlying Gettysburg Tower and Payne,
as well as the claims made by the plaintiffs, helped convince
Pennsylvania courts that the Amendment is categorically anti-
development. In retrospect, these cases may not have been the
best cases to educate the courts about the value of Article I,
Section 27. When new laws are passed, citizen litigants and the
See Kury, supra note 4, § 2-2.3 (explaining the use of the Payne test by the governor, the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation, the Public Utility Commission, the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission,
the Pennsylvania Game Commission, the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission,
and municipalities). Article I, Section 27 requires, however, that public natural resources be
conserved and maintained for the benefit of all people, including those in future generations.
Future generations are unlikely to regard a degraded environment as one that has been
conserved and maintained simply because it might have been degraded more.
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government often bring easier cases first. If successful, they often
use their prior victories to provide a foundation for winning more
difficult cases. Here, by contrast, courts were confronted from the
outset with two cases that pushed the extreme boundaries of the
Amendment. Two months after the voters approved Article I,
Section 27, the state in Gettysburg Tower challenged a private
landowner's unregulated use of its own land.1 3 Then, citizens
and others in Payne used the Amendment to challenge the
diversion of three percent of a public commons for a road-widening
project whose effects were already subject to significant environ-
mental regulation. Instead of educating the courts about how the
Amendment makes sense, these cases frightened the courts into
thinking that the Amendment could stop all development.
A brief review of Gettysburg Tower and Payne demonstrates
the devastating effect of the claims made on behalf of the Amend-
ment against these two proposals. After the trial court denied the
state's requested injunction in Gettysburg Tower, the state ap-
pealed, arguing that "some injury to the values entitled to preserva-
tion by Article I, Section 27" was sufficient to justify an injunction,
not "great injury."" In rejecting that view, the commonwealth
court stated that the government's claim was impractical:
It is difficult to conceive of any human activity that does not in
some degree impair the natural, scenic and esthetic values of
any environment. If the standard of injury to historic values is
to be that expressed by the Commonwealth's witnesses as an
"intrusion" or "distraction", [sic] it becomes difficult to imagine
any activity in the vicinity of Gettysburg which would not
unconstitutionally harm its historic values.'0 5
The Payne case built on and elaborated this concern by
addressing the effect of Article I, Section 27 on conventional
development. The commonwealth court in Payne began its analysis
by citing its own conclusion in Gettysburg Tower that the govern-
ment's claim about the Amendment would bring all development
to a halt, even though the Gettysburg Tower court rejected that
claim about the Amendment.1" "Likewise," the Payne court
103. See supra Part II.B.
104. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886, 895
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
105. Id. at 895.
106. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
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said, "it becomes difficult to imagine any activity in the vicinity of
River Street that would not offend the interpretation of Article I,
Section 27 which the plaintiffs urge upon us."10' 7 The court
continued:
We hold that Section 27 was intended to allow the normal
development of property in the Commonwealth, while at the
same time constitutionally affixing a public trust to the manage-
ment of public natural resources of Pennsylvania. The result of
our holding is a controlled development of resources rather than
no development."°
The court then stated its three-part test for determining
compliance with the Amendment."°9 Concern over the Amend-
ment's anti-development potential was also expressed in subsequent
cases.
110
B. The Amendment Embodies Conservation or Sustainable
Development
An analysis of the Amendment, rather than the claims made
by litigants about the Amendment, demonstrates that the anti-
development characterization is erroneous. Article I, Section 27 is
not anti-development; it supports what was then called conservation
and what we now call sustainable development. "The conservation
of natural resources is the key to the future," wrote Gifford
Pinchot, who had been a Pennsylvania governor as well as the first
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added). The court added that "[jiudicial review of the endless
decisions that will result from such a balancing of environmental and social concerns must
be realistic and not merely legalistic." Id.
109. See id. at 94-96.
110. In one, the Department of Environmental Resources and private citizens challenged
the Public Utility Commission's approval of a right-of-way for an electric transmission line,
arguing that the Commission was constitutionally obliged to prohibit the transmission line
"if it will have any effect on the interests enumerated in Article I, Section 27." Common-
wealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Commonwealth, Pub. Util. Comm'n, 335 A.2d 860, 864
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). The court rejected "the absolute interpretation urged upon us here"
as potentially limiting all development, and held that the applicant was only required to show
compliance with the Payne test, and only if someone challenging the application showed that
the interests protected by Article I, Section 27 would be adversely affected. See id. at 864-65.
Similar reasoning was employed in Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Com-
monwealth, Dep't of Transp., 335 A.2d 860, 864 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (challenging the
location of electronic transmission lines); and Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Common-
wealth, Pub. Util. Comm'n, 313 A.2d 185, 191-92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (challenging a
petroleum pipeline).
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director of the United States Forest Service.' "The very exis-
tence of our nation, and of all the rest, depends on conserving the
resources which are the foundations of its life."" 2 Similarly but
more broadly, sustainable development has been defined as
"socially responsible economic development" that protects "the
resource base and the environment for the benefit of future
generations.""' 3  The nations of the world endorsed sustainable
development at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development as a response to growing global poverty
and environmental degradation." 4  Its basic premise is that
human activity should and can be planned and conducted not only
to "coexist with healthy ecosystems but actually [to] enhance
them."" 5
The text, legislative history, constitutional status, and referen-
dum approval of the Amendment all support the conclusion that
Article I, Section 27 furthers conservation or sustainable develop-
ment-and is emphatically not anti-development. The public trust
part of the Amendment obliges the state to conserve and maintain
public natural resources for the benefit of all people. This part of
Article I, Section 27 provides a classic expression of conservation
because it expressly links natural resources protection to human use
and enjoyment of resources. Similarly, the environmental fights
part of the Amendment gives the people the right to the preserva-
tion of certain values in the environment without giving them the
right to the preservation of specific features on which those values
are based. Thus, people can make use of the environment so long
as they preserve its values. The rights to clean air and pure water
111. GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 324 (1947).
112. Id.; see also generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959); JOHN F.
REIGER, AMERICAN SPORTSMEN AND THE ORIGINS OF CONSERVATION (rev. ed. 1986).
113. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, 8.7,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
114. See generally John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for
National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1998) (explaining the concept of
sustainable development, particularly at the national level). The concept of sustainable
development is contained in two texts that the world's nations endorsed at the confer-
ence-Agenda 21, a blueprint for sustainable development, and the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, a set of principles to guide national and international efforts
toward sustainable development. See id. at 21-23.
115. J. Baird Callicott, The Wilderness Idea Revisited: The Sustainable Development
Alternative, in ECOLOGICAL PROSPECTS: SCIENTIFIC, RELIGIOUS AND AESTHETIC
PERSPECTIVES 37, 38 (Christopher Key Chapple ed. 1994).
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are arguably the most extreme parts of the Amendment. But more
than three decades of pollution control laws has shown that
economic development is compatible with, and even requires,
cleaner air and purer water."6 Moreover, constitutional provi-
sions are rarely interpreted in absolute terms.
The legislative history also demonstrates an intent to allow
human use of renewable resources. As originally drafted, for
example, the state's public trust duty was to "preserve and
maintain" protected resources "in their natural state.""' 7 Howev-
er, the legislature modified this duty. It deleted "in their natural
state," so that the state was only obligated to "preserve and
maintain" public trust resources.' 8 Then, as already noted, it
changed "preserve" to "conserve. 11 9
Article I, Section 27 also fosters sustainable development by
giving constitutional parity to environmental protection and
development. An important principle of constitutional interpreta-
tion is that the provisions of the constitution should be read so as
to give effect to each. 2 ° The state's constitution is "an integrated
whole," and courts thus are to give effect "to all of its provisions
whenever possible.' 121 When an environmental provision is
written into the constitution, all constitutional decision making
concerning other provisions must be reconciled with the Amend-
ment whenever possible. That creates an obligation by the state to
ensure that consideration and protection of constitutional values
concerning the environment are made part of all state decision
making. Thus, individual constitutional provisions do not trump
other constitutional provisions; they are to be harmonized if
possible. 2 2  By protecting private property, for example, the due
116. See REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 21ST CENTURY ENVIRONMENT COMMISSION
42 (1998) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION] (indicating that the
control of point source discharges of water pollutants "has significantly improved water
quality but not necessarily overall aquatic ecosystem quality"); see also id. at 51-52 (noting
improvements in air quality over past quarter century and future challenges).
117. H.B. 958, Printer's No. 1105, 168th Pa. Sess. (Pa. 1969).
118. Id., Printer's No. 1307.
119. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Davis, 440 A.2d 1380, 1381-82 (Pa. 1982).
121. Id. at 1381.
122. The constitution thus fosters integrated decision making, which is an essential
element of sustainable development. In part, integrated decision-making is the simultaneous
and coherent consideration of economic, environmental, and social factors in making a
particular decision. See Agenda 21, supra note 113, 8.4 ("The primary need is to integrate
environmental and developmental decision-making processes."); see also WORLD COM-
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process and takings provisions of the state constitution'23 reward
human efforts to use and develop such property. Because these
provisions give constitutional status to property rights, the constitu-
tion had a bias in favor of conventional development before the
amendment was adopted.124 Article I, Section 27 does not trump
property rights provisions. Indeed, the Amendment's history
demonstrates a concerted effort to ensure that its text could not be
used for that purpose. Because Article I, Section 27 is placed in
the state constitution, however, it obliges the state and other
decision makers to reconcile environmental protection and property
rights. Thus, Article I, Section 27 moves the state constitution from
an orientation toward conventional development at the environ-
ment's expense to one of environmentally sustainable develop-
ment.125
The referendum approval process for Article I, Section 27 also
supports this conclusion. One basic principle of constitutional
interpretation is that constitutional amendments should be read to
reflect the views of the ratifying voters.126 The people who voted
MISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 62 (1987)
[hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE] ("The common theme throughout this strategy for
sustainable development is the need to integrate economic and ecological considerations in
decision making.")
In this respect, sustainable development is not a new issue but a broader and more
comprehensive way of analyzing and acting on all issues. Just as environmental problems
cannot be separated from economic and social issues, social and economic goals cannot be
considered separately from the environment. Integrated decision-making also means that
the various decisions affecting particular social, environmental, and economic goals should
actually further those goals.
123. See PA. CONST. art. 1 §§ 1, 9, 10.
124. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 905.
125. This middle approach is essential in Pennsylvania. Virtually every square inch of
land in the state has been logged, farmed, mined, paved, or built upon over the past several
centuries. The state's waters have been fished, dredged, dammed, and used for waste
disposal in the same period. Indeed, the Amendment was broadly intended to ensure that
future development would not continue the environmental destructiveness that has occurred
historically. See FRANKLIN L. KURY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC ESTATE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 27 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 1-4 (1985).
As indicated by some of the cases decided under Article I, Section 27, in fact, past
development requires restoration of the environment, not just prevention of future
incursions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 371 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1977),
appeal dismissed sub non., Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Pennsylvania, 434 U.S. 807 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1973). On the other hand, the
enormous economic productivity and social well-being of the state depend upon the ability
of individuals and corporations to lawfully pursue their own ends.
126. When faced with different interpretations of the same provision, courts are to favor
a natural reading that avoids contradictions and difficulties in implementation, completely
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for Article I, Section 27 surely did not expect their vote to result
in major reversals in their standard of living. Otherwise, they
would have voted against it. Nor, one must believe, did they think
their vote was meaningless. If they did, they would not have
bothered to vote at all. The voters sought instead a reconciliation
of social and economic development with environmental and
natural resources protection. They wanted continuing social and
economic opportunities, in sum, but they also wanted to see
environmental progress.
The Amendment's focus on values and resources indicates
some kind of governmental and perhaps even private obligation to
consider and protect resources and values holistically. Statutes and
regulations may protect some resources and values but not others,
or may not provide sufficient protection. More basically, the
constitution focuses on what we need to protect, not the statutory
or regulatory means that are used to provide that protection. Thus,
while the state may improve the effectiveness of particular
regulatory programs, or the private sector may improve the
efficiency with which energy or materials are used, the Amendment
asks a fundamental question about such efforts: are they resulting
in protection of the resources and values identified in Article I,
Section 27? All too often, for example, improvements in efficiency
or effectiveness are offset by a greater level of polluting activity,
meaning that these improvements in technique are not preventing
deterioration of environmental quality.'27  Indeed, a major
strength of Article I, Section 27 is that it forces us to focus on the
health of the environment itself. Because environmental conditions
are never static or unchanging, moreover, the only sure way to
support the environment is to protect and even restore it.
Sustainable development seems more possible now than it did
three decades ago. Environmental laws adopted in the past several
decades provide evidence that environment and development goals
are necessarily related. In the 1970s, Congress enacted legislation
conforms to the intent of the framers, and reflects the views of the ratifying voter. See, e.g.,
Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1170-71 (Pa. 1981).
127. Perhaps the most well-known example is automobile pollution. The improvements
in emissions controls on newer vehicles are substantially offset by increases in vehicle miles
traveled and number of automobiles. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 763 (2d ed. 1996).
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1130to control air pollution,' water pollution, 29 coal mining,"'
and other environmental problems.13 The conservation laws of
earlier decades have also improved our forests, reduced soil
erosion, and helped to protect our water supplies. Reductions in
environmental contamination have contributed to human health
and better quality of life, and have occurred along with growing
prosperity.
13 2
Article I, Section 27 forces us to go further, and to imagine
and work for a Pennsylvania in which there is clean air and pure
water; a Pennsylvania where we preserve the natural, scenic,
historic, and esthetic values of the environment, and a state that
conserves and maintains public natural resources for the benefit of
present and future generations.133 While Article I, Section 27
128. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q (1994).
129. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
130. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(1994 & Supp. III 1997).
131. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
132. A "prosperous economy, a healthy citizenry and a better environment are directly
linked to each other. To make progress in any one area, Pennsylvania must strive for
simultaneous excellence in all." REPORT OF THE 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION, supra note
116, at 12. Indeed, in his second inaugural address, Governor Tom Ridge specifically linked
environmental protection to job creation. See Governor Thomas J. Ridge, 1999 Inaugural
Address, reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UPDATE, Jan. 22, 1999, at 28.
133. Cf. Eric T. Freyfogle, Illinois Life: An Environmental Testament, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1081, 1082 ("One aim of environmentalism is ... to stimulate our communal
imagination, to encourage us to consider what the land might look like if it really were
healthy, and how we and our descendants might better flourish if we inhabited such a
land.").
Both the Amendment and sustainable development seek to foster intergenerational
equity. The most commonly used definition of sustainable development specifically includes
this idea; present development must not compromise "the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs." OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 122, at 43. The gist of that
responsibility is to ensure that future generations inherit an environment that is of at least
equal quality to the present environment. Intergenerational equity is based on the moral
obligation of each generation "to future generations to pass on the natural and cultural
resources of the planet in no worse condition than received and to provide reasonable access
to the legacy for the present generation." EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY 37 (1989). Intergenerational equity also captures the politically accepted norm that
each generation should enjoy a better life than the previous one.
The text of Article I, Section 27 expressly and implicitly incorporates the principle of
intergenerational equity. The public trust part of the Amendment declares "Pennsylvania's
public natural resources" to be "the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come." Similarly, the environmental rights part of the amendment
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does not, and cannot, state the specific details for realizing that
vision in particular parts of Pennsylvania in particular times, it
creates a constitutional framework for achieving and maintaining
such a vision."'
IV. Government Responsibilities as the Primary Basis for
Citizen Rights
Much of the early enthusiasm for the Amendment was based
on the idea that it would enhance citizen access to judicial relief on
environmental matters. Franklin Kury, the chief legislative sponsor
of the Amendment, wrote that his hope in offering the Amendment
was "that the declaration of environmental rights would be used by
the courts on a case-by-case basis to develop a body of environ-
mental rights law comparable to that developed by courts interpret-
ing the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.
'1 35
Because citizens could challenge environmental incursions in court,
he explained, those who adversely affect the environment would
have to modify their behavior.
136
This explanation contains two important truths. One is that
the ability of citizens to bring judicial actions is a necessary element
of any effective system for environmental protection. The other is
that citizen claims under the Amendment must correspond to the
obligations of the government and perhaps others. If citizens have
a right to clean air, pure water, and the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment, then the
government and perhaps others surely have an obligation not to
interfere with those rights. If citizens have a right to the conserva-
tion and maintenance of public natural resources, then that right
also defines the government's responsibilities for those resources.
Nearly three decades later, however, only one part of this
equation is operative. Citizens have the ability to raise Article I,
Section 27 claims under a great variety of circumstances, but a
constitutionally-based understanding of the government's responsi-
provides a public right in the "preservation" of certain environmental values, a word that is
meaningless if it refers only to the present generation.
134. Article I, Section 27 does not, however, speak to many of the national and interna-
tional issues that sustainable development addresses. These include, but are not limited to,
consumption of materials and energy, and financial assistance to developing countries. See,
e.g., Dernbach, supra note 114, at 42-50.
135. Kury, supra note 2, at 124.
136. See id. at 124.
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bilities under Article I, Section 27 has been lost. The Gettysburg
Tower case upheld the Attorney General's authority to protect
environmental rights under the Amendment. Because the case was
brought against a private landowner, though, and because the
Attorney General does not have any general legal duty to bring
cases protecting environmental rights, the case contains no express
statement of the government's responsibilities for environmental
rights.
While the Payne test suggests that the state has some responsi-
bilities under the public trust part of the Amendment, the language
of the test also suggests that these responsibilities exist only on a
project-by-project basis. The test contains no statement of the
government's overall responsibilities for public natural resources.
Nor, under the Payne test, are citizens ordinarily able to make
meaningful claims that the government should do anything that it
is not already doing. Plaintiffs in court, and appellants challenging
the issuance of pollution control permits, have almost never
successfully used the Payne test to stop or change a project. 37
They have not been able to use the test, for example, to prevent a
stream relocation project to remedy existing hazardous condi-
tions,138 to prevent the construction of pumping stations and other
facilities to divert water from a stream to supply water for cooling
a nuclear generating station,139 or to overturn permits approved
by the state Department of Environmental Resources. t4° In sum,
while the Amendment provides citizens a basis for requesting
judicial relief, it has not been used to impose meaningful responsi-
bilities on government.
The Amendment has not worked like other provisions in the
Bill of Rights, or the corresponding Declaration of Rights in the
137. See Kury, supra note 4, § 2-2.1 (citing more than a dozen projects for which Article
I, Section 27 challenges were unsuccessful). But see id. § 2-2.3.4 (citing a Public Utility
Commission denial of an application to construct a natural gas pipeline because applicant
failed to demonstrate compliance with Payne test).
138. See In re Condemnation for Legislative Route 58818, 375 A.2d 1364 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1977).
139. See Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 513 A.2d 593
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl.
Resources, 508 A.2d 348 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
140. Smartwood v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 424 A.2d 993 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1981) (sewage facilities plan approval). The Department of Environmental
Resources was divided and renamed the Department of Environmental Protection by the
Conservation and Natural Resources Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1340.101-.1103 (West
Supp. 1998-99).
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Pennsylvania Constitution, 14 because it is unlike those provisions.
The second and third sentences in the Amendment establish an
affirmative governmental trusteeship for public natural resources
for which there is no parallel in the United States Bill of Rights or
the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights. All other provisions of the
Bill of Rights and Declaration of Rights are "negative rights;" they
simply prevent the state from acting in certain ways.142 In addi-
tion, all of the other amendments in the Bill of Rights and
Declaration of Rights are directed toward protection of individuals
or their property. The two parts of the Amendment, taken
together, are broader because they encompass individuals, private
property, and the outdoor environment. This, coupled with the
express or implied government responsibilities in the Amendment,
suggests that the government has a much larger role in implement-
ing this Amendment than other provisions of the Declaration of
Rights.
As the text of Article I, Section 27 indicates, the government's
constitutional responsibilities are twofold. First, the state is obliged
to conserve and to maintain public natural resources. Second, by
providing a public right to clean air, pure water, and the preserva-
tion of certain environmental values, Article I, Section 27 also
implies that the state has a duty not to interfere with that right.
These responsibilities are the same from project to project, though
their effect on individual projects will obviously vary depending on
the projects themselves.
Remarkably, these responsibilities have been generally ignored.
They are absent from the three-prong Payne test. Although a
governmental duty not to interfere with the preservation of certain
values can be inferred from Gettysburg Tower, no court has yet
held that this duty exists. Nor have the courts recognized explicitly
the state's public trust responsibility for public natural resources.
Yet these responsibilities provide the foundation for any allegation
by citizens that their rights under the Amendment have been
violated.
V. A More Constructive and Useful Judicial Role
The tendencies to treat Article I, Section 27 as an indivisible
whole, to perceive it as anti-development, and to ignore the
141. See PA. CONST. art. I (Declaration of Rights), which includes Section 27.
142. See WOODSIDE, supra note 20, at 177-78.
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government's responsibilities have led to a relatively minor role for
the Amendment. Perhaps more important than these tendencies,
however, is an understanding that the legislative and executive
branches are more competent to address environmental matters
than the courts. While there is much truth in that understanding,
there still remains a substantial role for the courts.
A. Primary Responsibility in Legislative and Executive Branches
Almost three decades after Article I, Section 27 was adopted
in 1971, legislation and administrative regulation, rather than the
Amendment, carry out the greatest share of the state's environmen-
tal work. The number, complexity, and stringency of environmen-
tal statutes and regulations is much greater now than when the
Amendment was first adopted.143 The Amendment was adopted
at the beginning of the modern environmental era in Pennsylvania
as well as the United States. At the federal level, a significant
number of major statutes were adopted, beginning in 1969.1"
Many of these statutes required states to adopt or upgrade
legislation in order to continue operating their own environmental
regulatory programs.'45 Thus, many Pennsylvania problems that
might have been addressed through lawsuits under Article I,
Section 27 were instead addressed by legislation as well as the
development and implementation of administrative regulations.
The existence of an alternative institutional means of addressing
these problems, in turn, weakened the claim that the courts were
necessary to vindicate public rights.
The language and subject matter of the Amendment also
provide a basis for believing that the legislative and executive
branches are better suited to make many decisions on these issues
than the courts. The scientific and technical complexity of
environmental problems, the existence of competing policies, and
the economic and social consequences of environmental protection
put resolution of most environmental matters outside the expertise
143. For a useful summary and explanation of most of those laws, see PENNSYLVANIA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4.
144. See J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY § 1.2(I) (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993); see also
text accompanying notes 128-131.
145. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Pennsylvania's Implementation of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act: An Assessment of How "Cooperative Federalism" Can Make
State Regulatory Programs More Effective, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 903 (1986).
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and ordinary role of judges. In lawsuits under Article I, Section 27
that do not involve review of decisions made by administrative
agencies, courts must decide these questions on their own.
Performing that task in a competent manner can be daunting. In
the absence of legislation or regulations, courts are often reluctant
to make the difficult technical and policy calls that environmental
decision-making requires.
The gap between many current development practices and the
vision of sustainable development contained in Article I, Section 27
reinforces the need for legislation and regulations because it
suggests the need for a coherent strategy for implementing the
Amendment. The judiciary is not well positioned to provide or
implement such a strategy. The other two branches are, however,
particularly if they can work together. Significantly, it is well
recognized that implementation of the sustainable development
framework requires a concerted strategy, perhaps especially in the
executive branch, but also with significant legislative support and
participation." This means that effective implementation of the
Amendment will depend, in the final analysis, on a meaningful and
continuing commitment by both the executive and legislative
branches. Not only do they need to create and implement a
coherent strategy, they must also fill in the details and authorize
appropriate institutions to take necessary actions.
Finally, and perhaps most basically, the Amendment lacks the
specificity necessary to precisely delineate appropriate behavior in
the variety of contexts to which it will inevitably be applied. While
it provides boundaries for that behavior, and contains some basic
principles, legislative and administrative decisions will be needed to
foster sustainable development in Pennsylvania.
These reasons lead to a basic question about the relevance of
Article I, Section 27. The short answer is that it continues to be
relevant, even essential, though perhaps not for the same reasons
as originally envisioned. This answer is based on two mutually-
reinforcing ways of interpreting the Amendment, and on judicial
enforcement of these interpretations.
146. See Dernbach, supra note 114, at 69-72.
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B. Judicial Role in Enforcing Amendment
1. Substantive Rules to Close Legislative or Administrative
Gaps-Article I, Section 27 is most obviously applied through
substantive rules protecting environmental rights and the public
trust. Understood in this way, the Amendment prevents the
legislative and executive branches, and perhaps private citizens,
from undermining public rights to public natural resources or a
clean environment. This substantive approach provided the basic
rationale for the Amendment. Article I, Section 27 was intended
to ensure that the government protects natural resources and the
environment, rather than encourage or support their degrada-
tion.14 7 Because the ordinary political process had often failed to
protect these rights, a constitutional rule was required to correct
the process.'48 Substantive constitutional rules invalidate legisla-
tion, regulations, administrative agency actions, and other actions
that are inconsistent with these rules. Such rules thus prevent the
political process from adversely affecting environmental rights and
the public trust, and may even encourage their protection. When
statutes do protect the environment, substantive constitutional rules
can also effectively prevent their repeal; the Amendment was
intended in part to prevent backsliding.
49
The public trust part of the Amendment lends itself most
obviously to this interpretation because the text says that the state
has a duty to conserve and protect public natural resources. It is
difficult to think of a more obvious way to enforce the public trust
part of the Amendment than as a substantive duty.
The public trust part of the Amendment is also like a great
many other amendments to the federal and state constitutions that
specify the way in which governmental machinery should oper-
ate."' In a basic sense, this part of Article I, Section 27 is simply
147. See KURY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC ESTATE, supra note 125, at 1-2.
Between the end of the Civil War and the mid 1960s, "the Pennsylvania legislature was
dominated by the iron, steel, coal, and railroad interests," which ensured that laws limiting
environmental exploitation were limited in scope or inapplicable to those interests. Id.
148. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 880-81, 884-87.
149. See KURY, NATURAL RESORUCES AND THE PUBLIC ESTATE, supra note 125, at 4
("[Any student of history knows that political tides rise and fall. What one legislature
passes, another may repeal or amend.").
150. See Ruhl, supra note 14, at 256-57; see also, e.g., PA. CONST. arts. II (basic rules
concerning operations of legislature), III (basic rules for passage of legislation), IV (basic
rules concerning operation of executive branch), V (basic rules concerning operation and
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a rule for the management of certain public property. A substan-
tive interpretation is thus neither novel or remarkable. Because a
substantive interpretation would prevent the state from authorizing
or allowing private appropriation or degradation of public natural
resources, moreover, such an interpretation would be consistent
with the Amendment's original purpose. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the public trust part of the Amendment builds on pre-
existing common law public trust rules that impose substantive
duties on the government for its management of certain resourc
es.15t Given the explicit recognition of this common law back-
ground in the development of the Amendment, the public trust part
of the Amendment necessarily imposes substantive limitations on
the use of public natural resources.
The environmental rights part of the Amendment also imposes
a substantive limitation, as the Gettysburg Tower case indicates.
The text states that the public has a right to clean air, pure water,
and the preservation of certain values. What more basic way is
there to protect these public rights than to prohibit substantial
interference with them? This part of the Amendment, moreover,
is similar to the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution and
the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights in several important
respects. Because this part of the Amendment and the Declaration
of Rights create individual rights, and because these rights
necessarily limit the ability of the government and perhaps others
to infringe on them, it is logical and appropriate to treat the first
sentence of the Amendment as imposing substantive limitations.
Just like the public trust part of the Amendment, moreover, the
environmental rights part was intended to prevent government
from encouraging and supporting pollution and other damage to
environmental values. Application of the first sentence as a
substantive limit is thus consistent with, and even necessary to
accomplish, the Amendment's purposes.
Substantive application of both parts of the Amendment is also
similar to the manner in which common law rules now operate in
environmental cases. Before environmental statutes became
widespread, the common law provided a means of redress for
citizens who were adversely affected by pollution. Although
greater use of legislation and regulation over the past several
administration of courts).
151. See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 20, at 422-23.
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decades has reduced the need for common law actions, common
law rules still provide a minimum level of protection for the public.
When there is no legislation, or when it is being inadequately
enforced, public nuisance and other common law actions are
available for public use.152  Similarly, although an explosion in
environmental legislation and administrative regulations has
weakened the claim that Article I, Section 27 is necessary to
address imbalances in the political process,153 gaps still exist.
These include the absence of effective legislation for suburban
sprawl and protection of biodiversity 54 There is no reason why
the constitution should play less of a substantive gap-filling role
than the common law. Substantive enforcement of Article I,
Section 27 is thus most appropriate when legislation and regulation
is not protecting the public.
This approach to constitutional interpretation would funda-
mentally alter the way in which Article I, Section 27 is currently
understood, and would make the Amendment's interpretation more
consistent with that of other provisions in the constitution. It
would make the constitution's text the test for the adequacy of
legislation. If a statute provided the protection required by Article
I, Section 27, then the statute and any action taken under it would
presumably pass constitutional muster.
At present, however, many statutes administered by the
Department of Environmental Protection and the Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources specifically include a state-
ment that they are intended to implement Article I, Section 27.55
152. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 15, at 157-58.
153. Judicial deference to administrative decision making and the technical nature of
many environmental decisions contribute to the weakening of that claim.
154. See generally REPORT OF 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION, supra note 116 (identifying
these and other environmental problems requiring new or modified legislation). Subsidies,
tax laws, and similar legislation may even be environmentally destructive, although they are
much less visible to the public than regulatory statutes. See, e.g., id. at 16 (identifying
expenditures on "water and sewer infrastructure and on roads" as significant contributors to
sprawl).
155. See Dam Safety and Encroachment Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 693.2(3) (West
1997); Wild Resource Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5302(1) (West 1997);
Environmental Education Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7522(1) (West Supp. 1998-99);
Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.301(16) (West 1993); Land
Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 6026.102(4) (West Supp. 1998-99); Pennsylvania Safe Drinking Water Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 721.2(b) (West 1993); Solid Waste Management Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 6018.102(10) (West 1993); Pennsylvania Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste
Reduction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.102(b)(13) (West 1997); Oil and Gas Act, PA.
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Other statutes, by contrast, do not. Pennsylvania courts have been
more willing to uphold an agency decision that furthers Article I,
Section 27 when such a finding is contained in the legislation.'56
In one case, in fact, the commonwealth court may have suggested
legislative balancing satisfies the Payne test when the statutes at
issue state an intent to implement Article I, Section 27. 57 Osten-
sibly, the courts are willing to reach these conclusions because the
Amendment was considered in the drafting of some statutes but
not in the drafting of others. But there is no evidence to support
this conclusion; no categorical difference between the first and
second group of statutes exists except for the statement of intent.
The protection of public values and resources under the
Amendment, moreover, depends not on the legislature's intent but
on the legislation's effect. The Clean Streams Law'5 8 and the Air
STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 601.102(4) (West 1996); Pennsylvania Appalachian Trial Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 64, § 802 (West Supp. 1998-99); Conservation and Natural Resources Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1340.101(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998-99).
156. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1365-66 (Pa.
1986).
157. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Casey, 600 A.2d 260, 264-65 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991). In this case, the governor issued an executive order imposing categorical
substantive and procedural limits on municipal waste landfill and resource recovery facility
operations. See id. at 261. The court held that the executive order constituted legislation,
and that the governor lacked the authority under Article I, Section 27 to issue the executive
order on his own. See id. at 265. Under the state constitution, legislation must be passed
by both houses and either signed by the governor or passed by a two-thirds majority over
his veto. See PA. CONST. art. II, § 1; art. IV, § 15. The executive order was not adopted in
that manner, and it was not adopted through the rulemaking process of an administrative
agency possessing properly delegated statutory authority. The court also held that the
provisions of the executive order conflicted with existing legislation. See Waste Management,
600 A.2d at 265.
The court's holding that Article I, Section 27 does not provide the governor with
power to exercise legislative authority is unobjectionable. However, the court then added,
in dicta: "The balancing of environmental and societal concerns, which the Commonwealth
argues is mandated by Article I, Section 27, was achieved through the legislative process
which enacted Acts 97 and 101 [the two basic municipal waste regulatory statutes] and which
promulgated the applicable regulations." Id.
This statement should not be taken at face value because it was not necessary to
decide the case, because the statement was made in the context of a discussion of legislative
authority, and because the court did not even attempt to explain how this legislation
automatically met the Payne test. Moreover, the statement stands the constitution on its
head because it makes legislation the defining measure of what the constitution means.
Because the Pennsylvania constitution provides the standard against which legislation should
be judged, legislation does not define what Article I, Section 27 means.
158. The Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.4 (West 1993) (purposes do
not include implementation of Article I, Section 27).
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Pollution Control Act,159 for example, contain no statement of
intent to implement Article I, Section 27, even though the
Amendment gives the public a specific right to clean air and pure
water, and even though these are the two main Pennsylvania
statutes that protect those rights. 6° To argue that these statutes
do not further the purposes of the Amendment to a substantial
degree would be absurd.'61
This is not to say that lawsuits under Article I, Section 27
should provide a basis for second-guessing administrative decisions
on highly technical matters. Rather, it suggests that Article I,
Section 27 should be available to prevent the state from allowing
or encouraging unmistakable environmental degradation, which
should in turn prompt the adoption of legislation in areas where
none now exists. In addition, the use of Article I, Section 27 as a
substantive limitation on legislation would further the Amend-
ment's purposes by preventing the legislature from encouraging or
allowing environmental damage.
2. Principle-Reinforcing Rules to Support Legislative or
Administrative Actions-Article I, Section 27 is also principle
reinforcing. The substantive application of constitutional provisions
necessarily reinforces the principles stated in those provisions, but
there are other ways in which constitutional provisions are
principle-reinforcing. Even when their substantive provisions are
not being directly applied, they can help support or limit the
application of other legal rules, provide a starting point for
understanding how particular problems should be addressed, and
provide a basis for determining how well the state is protecting the
159. Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §4002 (West 1993) (statement of
policy does not refer to Amendment).
160. As a practical matter, the use or nonuse of Article I, Section 27 in environmental
statutes is less a matter of government policy than of the preferences of the drafters.
161. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held several times that the Amendment
supports the interpretation and applicability of these two statutes. See, e.g., Commonwealth,
Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Locust Point Quarries, Inc., 396 A.2d 1205, 1209 (Pa. 1979) (air
quality); Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 367 A.2d 222,
226 n.10 (Pa. 1976) (air quality); Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 317 (Pa.
1973) (water quality).
Nor are legislative statements of intent necessary to implement the Amendment. The
environmental rights part of the Amendment is self-executing against private parties and the
government; the public trust part of the Amendment is also self-executing. These concepts
are developed in part II of this Article, which is forthcoming in Volume 104, issue one of the
Dickinson Law Review.
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environment. In these and other ways, the Amendment helps
foster a direct dialogue between the public and all parts of
government about the best means of protecting and supporting the
principles it states. 62 The repeated use and application of these
principles over time, in fact, deepens public and governmental
understanding of their meaning.
163
This principle-reinforcing approach does not appear to be the
primary approach that the drafters of Article I, Section 27 had in
mind, but it is attractive for several reasons. To begin with,
constitutional provisions represent an enduring commitment to the
values and principles they contain." The constitutional require-
ment that proposed amendments pass both houses twice and then
be approved in a public referendum 165 make it more difficult to
amend the constitution than to adopt legislation."6 The time and
deliberation required for constitutional amendments suggest that
Article I, Section 27 represents fundamental principles rather than
mere policy preferences.
1 67
The need for principle-reinforcing interpretations has become
more evident since the Amendment was adopted. Nearly three
decades later, it is increasingly obvious that environmental
protection is not a passing fad. If anything, it appears that efforts
to protect environmental values and public natural resources will
need to intensify."6 The number and complexity of statutes and
regulations have generated claims of overregulation and have
sometimes made it difficult for both the public and lawyers to
162. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 880-881, 902-03. The values at issue are not
necessarily those of the community itself, but rather those that the community has placed in
the constitution. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional
Law, 84 VA. L. REv. 389, 451-456 (1998).
163. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
constitution is an excellent example.
164. See Jed Rubenfield, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119,1143-46
(1995).
165. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
166. Legislation that has passed both houses, however, must first be presented to the
Governor for approval. See PA. CONST. art. IV, § 15. There is no such requirement for
constitutional amendments. See id. art. XI, § 1.
167. Thompson, supra note 12, at 882-84.
168. See generally REPORT OF 21ST CENTURY COMMISSION, supra note 116 (identifying
land use, natural resources conservation, and human health as major challenges in environ-
mental protection).
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understand what is at stake.'69 The Amendment provides a
directional compass over this complex landscape.
More basically, the Amendment states in effect that develop-
ment and environmental protection should be made compatible,
and obliges courts, other governmental decision-makers, and
citizens to think about how to make development sustainable. How
can the state protect property rights and simultaneously preserve
the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment?
How can the state use public resources and still conserve them for
the benefit of future generations? Whatever limitations the courts
may have in second-guessing policy decisions by the legislature and
technical decisions by administrative agencies, they are uniquely
qualified to recognize and safeguard important principles and
values. 7°  The distance between many current development
practices and the practices required by the Amendment reinforces
the role of an interpretative model that keeps the Amendment's
principles in front of decision makers.
VI. Conclusion
This Article suggests a different framework for understanding
and interpreting Article I, Section 27. First, and perhaps most
basically, the text of the Amendment matters. The text contains
two separate parts-environmental rights, which concerns actions
on public and private property; and public trust, which applies only
to publicly owned natural resources. Second, Article I, Section 27
requires the state to reconcile environmental protection and
development goals, not to "balance" the environment away to
foster economic development or use the environment to trump
development. Third, the Amendment imposes limits on the ability
169. In 1995, for example, the Department of Environmental Resources began a regulato-
ry basics initiative the object of which was to repeal any regulations that were more stringent
than federal requirements unless they had a compelling justification. See Department of
Environmental Protection, Proposed Amendments to Chapter 16 (Water Quality Toxics
Management Strategy, 28 Pa. Bull. 4289, 4289 (Aug. 29, 1998)). The initiative suggested that
federal law provided the primary source of state environmental values, except to the extent
that DEP identified important values on a regulation-by-regulation basis. Although recourse
to the Amendment would surely not answer each question of regulatory detail, the principles
and values it contains would have provided a more useful starting point. See Executive
Order 1996-1, 26 Pa. Bull. 856 (March 2, 1996), codified at 4 PA. CODE Ch. 1 (applying basic
principles of regulatory basics initiative to all agencies).
170. See Schapiro, supra note 162, at 417 (citing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 24-26 (1962)).
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of the state to adversely affect the environment, and those limits
need to be understood and recognized. Those limits, in turn, define
what rights citizens have to judicial relief. Finally, even though the
scope and detail of environmental legislation is much greater now
than in 1971, Article I, Section 27 may still be applied where gaps
exist. The Amendment can also be used to support the exercise of
government authority for environmental protection.17'
It is almost three decades since the beginning of the modern
environmental era, when Article I, Section 27 was adopted. We
have a much better understanding now of what we can achieve and
of the daunting challenges that lie ahead. We are more likely to
face those challenges successfully if we take Article I, Section 27
seriously, as constitutional law. That is, after all, the insight with
which we started.
171. The second and final part of this Article will develop this framework in greater
detail for each of the Amendment's major parts.
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